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Abstract: In the pages of this study we have emphasized the relation between Law and Morals, 
between what is just and in just, talkin
but also about the relation between the juridical norms and the moral principles. An evaluation of the 
historical process of the emergence of Law and Morals 
Law has evolved step by step from the Moral norms and from the customs of a moral nature, hence 
the conclusion that the positive juridical norms should also express, in their content, values of a moral 
nature. In fact, from an ontological poi
since the notions of “righteousness” and of “justice” themselves are categories of Morals. That is why 
the theory of juridical positivism, according to which the rule of Law can exist in the absenc
Morals since the state is the only source of Law, has no credibility both from a historical and 
philosophical and from a juridical point of view.
philosophers and jurists of our time to perceive and exp
adequately and, ipso facto, the relation between this one and Morals, was also determined by the 
international and European legislation regarding the human fundamental rights and liberties. 
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„knowledge”, as only the ones who shall pursue „the justice” (
acquire „wisdom” (σοφία
which – in its turn – is not possible without „gnosis” (science) and „knowledge”. In 
this sense, in the case of Law, too, these „gnosis” and ”knowledge” can only be 
gained by a painstaking study of this field, and, ipso facto, of the jurid
that the human spirit has created from the antiquity up to our days.
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During the antiquity numerous law systems have emerged (the Babilonian, the 
Egyptian, the Jewish, the Chinese one etc.), but none of them had succeeded in 
creating a unitary system of concepts that would have enabled the expression of a 
juridical thinking and language different from the common language. 
Consequently, „the juridical thinking of the peoples of the antiquity did not create 
their own juridical concepts and it was not able to approach the systematic and 
precise elaborations of the Roman Law, moreover, it could not exert any influence 
on the general evolution of the juridical ideas and institutions. In regard to all the 
systems of law in the antiquity, the Roman Law can be distinguished by the fact 
that it has created the basic elements of the juridical alphabet, by means of which 
the norms of law acquire an identity different from that of other social norms”. 
(Molcuţ, 2002, p. 11) 
However, the juridical thinking and expression owes to the Roman Law not only its 
own identity in relation to other social-humanistic sciences, but also the genesis of 
some present juridical concepts (for example, the concept of contractual obligation, 
of delictual obligation, the contract etc.), by means of which the juridical thinking 
of the society of our days can be expressed and due to which we can talk about a 
distinction between „sein” (what exists) and „sollen” (what should be). In this 
sense, we must see if, as regards the meaning of the two realities, „sein” and 
„sollen”, we are only dealing with an indicative or with an imperative of a 
preeminently juridical nature, devoid of any religious-moral content.  
„Taking a look at the historical process of the emergence of law, we shall notice 
that law has evolved step by step from the moral norms and customs. In this sense 
– a distinguished theoretician of law specified – the morals precede the law” (Popa, 
1998, p. 142). The same theoretician evinced the fact that the relation between law 
and morals „raises the problem of establishing the criteria on the basis of which a 
certain relation passes from the moral regulation to a juridical one” (Popa, 1998, 
p. 142). How this passage is done and what consequences or effects this has was 
not yet specified to us – in an explicit manner – by the specialized literature, given 
the fact that some theoreticians, who are usually enslaved to their own ideological 
orientation, do not usually have a right image of the content of moral norms, which 
are always conditioned by the relation between the Divinity and the Man. At last, 
we should say that any image that distorts the relation between Law and Morals 
leads to the fact that both the fundaments of the moral legitimacy of the positive 
juridical regulations and the criterion regarding the manner in which the human 
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behavior is regulated shall be regarded in a different manner by the two realities, 
„sein” and „sollen”.   
As the human behavior is regulated by the juridical norm, the human acts are 
themselves subject to the criterion of the juridical norm, so that we can say that the 
legislator is the one who decides on the attitude of the subject of law with regard to 
the three possibilities: the order, the prohibition or the persuasion. In turn, as the 
Ethics is concerned, the basis of the entire social order consists in the relation that 
is established between the man and the Divinity, which makes „justice” „a 
requirement of ethics” (Kelsen, 1962, p. 86), hence the necessity that law be a 
social norm with a moral value. 
Ontologically talking, we could not separate the law from morals as the very notion 
of „law”, of „justice”, is a category of ethics. That is why we can say that the 
theory of juridical positivism, according to which the rule of law can exist in the 
absence of ethics given that the state is „the only fundament of law” (Popa, 2002, 
p. 131), is actually uncovered.  
Montesquieu also noticed that „people are governed by different categories of 
laws: the natural law, the divine law, which is the law of religion; the church law, 
also called canon law, …,; the law of the people, that can be considered the world`s 
civil law, in the sense that every people is a citizen of the world; the general 
political law, the object of which is human wisdom, a basis of all societies; the 
particular political law, which refers to each and every society; …; the civil law of 
every society, … etc.” (Montesquieu, 1970, p. 203). In this sense, as it is well-
known, in our country, under the impact of some party-minded ideological 
orientations, some jurists have excluded from the categories the natural law, the 
divine law, the canon law etc.. Moreover, these Subjects were also eliminated from 
the syllabus of academic education and the respective Handbooks, books and 
specialized treaties were banned. Registered in special Inventory-Registers, they 
were afterwards also registered in the Catalogues of the secret fond. In this regard, 
we should also mention the fate of the Course of PhD Professor Jacob Lazăr, 
entitled „Church Law at the Faculties of Law”, which was published at Bucovina 
Publishing House of Bucharest in the year 1934. Banned by the authorities of the 
communist regime1, the printed course was registered in the Special Inventory and 
                                                 
1Among the books banned by the Ministry of Culture in the year 1964 (kept at “Special fund 1967”), 
we can also find the book of the canonist Iacob Lazăr. For details, see (Caravia & Albu et al., 2000, p. 
562). 
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then in the Catalogues of the Secret fund. And since in Romania of the respective 
age the „justice” was to reach its climax people have experienced and lived „… the 
religious prosecutions, the political decay, the induction of the duplicitous thinking 
at the level of the entire society and the pervertion of the social relations”, which 
have represented „the main components of the communist genocide in Romania”. 
(Boldur Lăţescu & Iorga, 2003, p. 3) 
With regard to the divine and human laws, the same Montesquieu wrote that they 
„differ by virtue of their origin, purpose and nature” (Montesquieu, 1970, p. 204). 
As their nature is concerned, the famous (French) „political writer” – as he himself 
used to call himself – said that „the nature of human laws is to be subject to all 
circumstances… that could appear and to change as the will of the people changes; 
on the contrary, it`s in the nature of religious laws to never change. The human 
laws decree with regard to good, the religion decrees with regard to the supreme 
good. The good can have a different purpose anytime, as there are several types of 
good; whereas the supreme Good is unique, this means it cannot change. Of course, 
laws can be changed, if they are not considered to be good; but the laws of religion 
– Montesquieu noticed – are always assumed to be the best…. In this sense, this 
remark was made by the one who has written about the spirit of laws, that is 
Montesquieu, still mentioned, in an erroneous manner, as a tutoring spirit of the 
divorce suit between "the sacred" and "the profane" by the theoreticians and jurists 
who have remained tributary to the anti-Christian spirit, generated and fueled by 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology propagated by the atheistic-communist political 
regimes. 
Evincing the perennial character of divine laws, in contrast to the ephemeral 
character of human laws, Montesquieu wrote that „in order to exist, the society 
needs something stable; and this stable thing is nothing but religion”. The same 
theoretician of law talked about „the force of religion”, which, – in his opinion – 
„first of all is based on the fact that people believe in it; the force of human laws – 
Montesquieu added – is based on the fact that people are afraid of them. The age of 
religion comes to its support, as we often believe the more in the truth of things the 
more distant they are in time because we don`t bear in our minds, as these things 
are concerned, ideas peculiar to those distant ages that could contradict them. On 
the contrary, the human laws benefit from their novelty, which shows a special and 
real attention on behalf of the legislator to make them respected” (Montesquieu, 
1970, pp. 204-205). 
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Of course, on the basis of these statements, too, we can both realize the way in 
which Montesquieu has understood the idea of law, law in its reason of being and 
the role that religious law has played in the life of the human society. Of course, 
divine laws should not replace the human laws; they can only humanize them 
through their religious-moral character. In this regard, the law of the Decalogue 
remains the most vivid example! 
Talking about the idea of law and of justice at the Romanians, the historians of the 
old Romanian law have noticed that, before being examined in the nomocanons, 
royal charters, deeds, court orders etc., it must be searched for in „the treasure of 
the Romanian folklore: the folk tales, sayings, poems as they better reflect the life 
of the people." (Peretz, 1915, p. 38) 
The same historians noticed that, at the Romanians, the word „law” is not used „as 
a noun, but only with an adjectival or adverbial meaning, referring to what is 
equitable. In this sense, this use also confirms the fact that the Romanians of the 
previous ages have perceived the Law as "Equitable Law", in which "the Law" and 
"the justice" meet (Aristotle). That this was the reality is also confirmed by the fact 
that they have only used the noun „justice", which actually corresponds to the 
Roman concept of safe and steady will to give everyone his due.    
"… This noun (justice, our mark) - Ion Peretz specified - has the remarkable 
particularity that it never expresses, apart from its usual meaning, the meaning of 
law, too" (Peretz, 1915, p. 39). Actually, „at the Romanians, the word justness 
appeared although the word justice did not exist, being derived from an adjective 
with the meaning of  rigid, equal, according to the rule: the adjective „just” (Peretz, 
1915, p. 40). 
They have stated that „... the origin of the modern Romanian concept of law must 
be looked for in France", a country from where the Romanians would have also 
„lent the laws. This idea - I. Peretz wrote – can be summed up in a single sentence: 
law must be separated from ethics" (Peretz, 1915, p. 50). Anyhow, up to the age of 
Cuza – when this lent took place – we cannot talk of such a separation between 
Law and Ethics. On the contrary, both within the customary and in the 
nomocanonical law, law is related to moral values that the Roman jurists have 
explicitly referred to – in their definitions – namely to “Good” and “Equity”. For 
example, through “ars boni et aequi” (art of the good and of equity), Celsus defined 
the law in categories of Ethics, as the good and the equity are two moral principles. 
In this sense, Ulpianus referred to the same moral principles when he conditioned 
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the functioning of the (distributive) justice to the obligation “to live honestly and to 
harm nobody” (honeste vivere, neminem laedere), and “to give everyone his due” 
(suum cuique tribuere).  
In a Christian writing from the II-nd century, we can read that „justice" has to be 
„the beginning and the end of the judgment"1. This idea of „justice" – of a 
Christian origin – can also be found in the old Romanian law. In this sense, up to 
„the idea of modern law", Romanians have guided themselves according to "the 
justice", which had its ontological basis and meaning in the divine justice, which is 
„the end and the beginning of judgment".  
In the Nomocanon of Matei Basarab2, „justice" is defined as follows: „Direptatea 
iaste un lucru mai adeverit de toate carea dă fieşi-cui direptate” („Justice is 
something more obvious than anything that distributes the justice to everyone") 
(Ch.2). This definition – taken over from the handbook of Manuel Malaxas, who 
had also taken it over from the Syntagma (Collection) of Matei Vlastares, - also 
goes back to the definition of Ulpianus, namely to that „suum cuique tribuere” (to 
give everyone his due). 
The fact that, in the Great Nomocanon, the notion of justice also expressed the 
meaning of the word „just" led to the conclusion that „... in the Romanian 
language, at the time when the Nomocanon has been written, there was only the 
noun justice, but not the noun just ..." (Peretz, 1915, p. 45). But this is not relevant 
for drawing the conclusion that, by 1652 – the Romanians did not use the word 
„just”, but only the word „justice”. Actually, in the Romanian literary sources from 
the second half of the XVII-th century, the word just is frequently used3, which 
confirms the fact that this noun had already enjoyed a large circulation in the old 
Romanian texts from the XVI-th century, when we can also talk about the 
„overcoming” of the Romanian writing (cf. P. P. Panaitescu). 
Consequently, we must stress and keep into our minds the fact that the Romanian 
noun "justice" did not come from the Latin word "justitia/ae” – as Ioan Peretz 
already mentioned – but from the adjective „justus”, which did not send to a 
conformity with something which is rectilineal, but to values with a preeminently 
                                                 
1Lettre de Barnabe (1991), I, 6, in Les Pères Apostoliques, p. 268. 
2About “Pravila lui Matei Basarab”(„The Nomocanon of Matei Basarab”), see (Drăguşin, 2001, no. 1-
6, p. 255-368; no. 7-12, pp. 253-321)  
3See, in this regard, the monument of the Romanian language, namely The Bible of Şerban 
Cantacuzino, published in the year 1688. 
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moral and religious content, namely to "Truth", to "Beauty" and to "Law". That 
this was the perception of Romanians concerning the "justice" is also confirmed by 
the Nomocanon of Târgovişte, printed and published in Târgovişte in the year 
1652, which stated that "the acknowledgement of justice is that somebody live in a 
moral and just manner in order not to accuse anybody", and "the wisdom of justice 
is to discern the godly and human things, that is justice and injustice"1. 
Therefore, according to the Great Nomocanon (“Pravila cea Mare”), "justice" 
implies, above all, that everyone among us live "in a good and just manner", 
because this is the only way we could distinguish "justice from injustice", that is 
the Good from the Evil. 
In the Calimach Code we only encounter the word „drit" (law), defined as a human 
faculty recognised by the law. In this sense, through the word „drit", the Calimach 
Code has both expressed  „just", and „justice" (Peretz, 1915, p. 49), namely that 
"jus aequi" (equitable law), about which Aristotle had once talked.   
The historians of Romanian law have also noticed that „in its juridical relations, the 
Romanian people were not preoccupied to settle the concept of law as a recognised 
faculty of a person to do certain things ... . To this people, the whole issue comes to 
the simpler and more concrete notion of power ... . And in order to appreciate this 
power, there is, on the one hand, justice, which indicates them if this power is just 
or injust; there is, on the other hand, the law, in the general sense of juridical rule, 
which decides what they are allowed and not allowed to do" (Peretz, 1915, pp. 42-
43). Hence their conclusion that, at the Romanians, the abstract notion of „just" can 
either be mistaken „for the just power or for the legal power". That is why the 
Romanians were content to using „the word law in order to express the legal power 
and the word justice to express the just power" (Peretz, 1915, p. 43), which finds its 
sense and basis in the moral Law. 
Initially, the word “lex” was used to express the written law and, at the same time, 
the act of reading and interpreting the will of the Divinity as in the old age, at the 
Romans, all the divine and human laws were considered to have been settled 
through the will of the Divinity, hence the usual phrase in those times: “fas est”, 
namely something which is allowed (by the gods) and, ipso facto, allowed by the 
law. After the publishing (the etching on brass tables) of “leges XII tabularum” (of 
the laws of the XII Tables), we can observe a certain distinction between what is 
                                                 
1Îndreptarea Legii, 1652 (2002), Glava a II-a. The amendment of the Law, 1652, ch. II. Published by 
the hyerodeacon Gheorghe Băbuş, p. 97. 
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allowed or tolerated by the gods and what is not allowed by the law (per lege non 
licet), although any act of submission to the will of the Roman legislator actually 
meant a submission to the will of the Divinity. 
Referring to the emergence and historical development of law, some theoreticians 
of law stated that, in the age of the primitive commune, the human society has been 
governed according to certain rules of behaviour that have been “… strongly 
imbued with the mystical, religious aspect. The observance of these rules was 
assured both on the basis of the internal mystical moral and religious motivations 
and of the punitive measures taken by the collectivity and by its leaders – the heads 
of families, the leaders of the peoples and tribes.” (Gheorghiu, 2004, p. 9) 
Apart from the regrettable fact that for some of the theoreticians of law – educated 
in the Romania of the years 1947-1989 – the notion “mystical” still has a 
derogatory meaning, we can notice both the lack of a holistic knowledge of the 
historical reality of those times and of the philosophical-religious reality, 
knowledge which would have allowed the respective theoreticians to assess the 
moral-religious aspect of those rules of behaviour in a trully scientific spirit. But, 
unfortunately, we encounter the same way of thinking and expression – still 
tributary to the School of the age of the communist regime1– by some 
contemporary historians of the Romanian law, who talk about “the magic and 
religious prescriptions” (tabu), which they include among  the norms of conduct 
with a customary character” (Bitoleanu, 2003, p. 10). 
Based on the information left by the Latin historian Iordanes, some historians of 
Romanian Law stated that, during the age of Burebista a system of laws in a 
written form (conscriptores) was also established, which included the legal orders 
and moral and religious prescriptions. Some of these had been transmitted orally 
and they were part of the old customary Law. 
The information of Iordanes – regarding the Geto-Dacians – has been regarded by 
some historians of Romanian law “with skepticism”, hence their conclusion that at 
the Dacians, “the existence of written laws” is “doubtful”. However, they admit the 
fact that, „as in the times of the the dawn of Rome, their conservation and 
dissemination was made through the mnemotechnical procedure noticed by 
                                                 
1About the thinking and the methods of this school, see the volume „Gândirea interzisă. Scrieri 
cenzurate/Prohibited thinking. Censored writings…”; (Stănescu, 2003). 
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Aristotle at the la Agathyrsi from Transilvania: versified and sung in order not to 
be forgotten” (Bitoleanu, 2003, p. 11). 
Some historians of “the Roman Dacia” have written that Dacia was conquered by 
the Romans not only by means of their weapons, but also through the capacity of 
„cultural illumination” of  Rome (cf. P. Grimal), as Dacia “was conquered through 
the western, Latin forms of the Greek-Roman culture” (Bărbulescu, 2001, p. 226). 
Therefore, in their opinion, “… nothing of what was typical of the natives (for 
example, the Zalmoxian religion or the sacred architecture) was ever perpetuated”. 
(Bărbulescu, 2001, p. 226). 
Thus, in the opinion of these historians, everything that was aboriginal has 
disappeared “little by little”, so that the Dacians found themselves caught in 
spirituality and a culture – a juridical culture inclusively – of an exclusively Roman 
nature. Of course, such opinions are not only uncovered in the context of the 
historical reality, they are also wrong through the lack of a logical judgment given 
that the spirit of promoting everything that was Roman was often shaped both 
“according to the requirements of the provincial social life (the so-called “vulgar 
law”)” (Hanga, 2001, p. 222) and to the customs of the Dacians.  
Regarding the implementation of the Roman juridical system in Traian’s Dacia, 
although we “do not have sufficient data (except for the waxed tables)”, anyhow, 
“from the way that the imperial provinces were organized and based on the 
juridical texts regarding these ones, we can recompose, by and large, the 
implementation of the Roman law in the new province” (Hanga, 2001, p. 219). In 
the implementation process of the Roman law, they took into account these very 
local customs or that old customary law of the Thraco-Geto-Dacians and of the 
Daco-Romans, upon which that “jus valachicum” or that “lex Terrae” (law of the 
Land) is based. This "law of the country" or of  "the land" was not only applied in 
the absence of "jus scriptum" (written law), which was to circulate in the 
geographical space of the Romanian Principalities since the age of the Roman rule 
and in the Middle Ages in the form of nomocanonical law, but in a parallel way to 
that „jus scriptum”. That this was the reality is also certified by the text of the 
Great Nomocanon (Târgovişte, 1652), which specifies in an "expressis verbis" 
manner that "where there is no written law, that`s where we have to follow the 
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customs of the place. And if there are no customs of the place, then the old people 
should decide how they could rule" (the 4-th Ch.)1.  
In the same Nomocanon they state, in an apodeictic manner, that "… the ancient 
customs shall be considered laws"2. Indeed, in the absence of the Roman or 
Byzantine "imperial laws", at the Romanians only the "old customs" of the country 
were followed. But also after the taking over of the Roman law and of the 
Byzantine law afterwards, these customs have not seldom continued to be 
prevalent or preeminent to „the imperial law”, often regarded and considered by 
the Romanians as being alien to the spirit of the country or of the land.  
If the Romans, by „lex", only understood the written law, which had to be observed 
and enforced by the human collectivity after its proclamation, in turn, at the Geto-
Dacians „the law” has initially had the meaning of unwritten norm, being however 
perceived as an emanation of the divine will, too. The law bound its subjects 
through an act of faith and conscience, which made Constantin Noica state that, at 
the Romanians, the word law does not come from „lex", which is derived from the 
verb “lego/legere” (= to read), but from the Latin re-ligio = to bind on the inside 
(Noica, 1970, p. 174), in faith and conscience, hence its sacred character. 
At the Romanians, this sacred link was expressed through the Latin word mos - 
moris = custom, which also went back to the law acquired through faith. The fact 
that, at the Romanians, the law was related from the beginning to a religious faith 
is also certified by the fact that „during the Middle Ages in Romania”, this one had 
the meaning of Christian Orthodox religious faith. When a Romanian answered to 
Hungarian or to a Turk that he is of „Romanian law”, he meant that he was a 
Romanian of Orthodox faith. Therefore, „the Romanian law” defined both his 
ethnical and his religious identity, which explains, in an evinced manner, the 
osmotic process of the genesis and evolution of the Romanian people in the spirit 
of its Orthodox, apostolic faith brought to Scythia Minor (Dobrudja) by the first 
one called to apostleship..., the Saint Apostle Andrew. The Pontical Dacia was 
indeed „caught in an organic manner in the process of evangelisation since the age 
of the Saint Apostle Andrew and of his disciples …. In the space between the 
                                                 
1
 Îndreptarea Legii/The amendment of the Law, p. 99. 
2
 The Great Nomocanon, published in Târgovişte in the year 1652, has taken over a text from "the 
Hexabiblos" of Constantine Armenopol, which was used in the Romanian Principalities after the 
Greek text from the printed editions. Actually, the Great Nomocanon mentions that: "Armenopol says 
that the old custom is taken into account and observed instead of the law" (ch. 4) (Apud Îndreptarea 
Legii/The amendment of the Law, p. 99). 
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Lower Danube and the Black Sea – the regretted historian Adrian Rădulescu wrote 
– the elementary traces of the Christian practices are present everywhere, here is 
where the Romanian ethnogenesis has integrated the Christian teachings in an 
organic manner ” (Rădulescu, 2001, p. 371). 
The Romanians have kept the conscience that the law is an emanation of the divine 
will up to the modern age. In the XVII-th century, for example, for the Romanians 
the Nomocanons of the Country (Longinescu, 1912) were „The amendment of the 
law with God”, „the Nomocanon with God”1, namely laws enforced under a divine 
authority.  
For the nomocanonical law, „justice” expressed a moral-Christian value, hence the 
phrase “amendment of the law” that we encounter in the Nomocanons from the 
XVII-the century. Anyhow, the notion of “amendment” had the meaning of 
judgment not only according to „the law”, but also according „to the justice”, 
which finally finds its fundament in the divine justice and juridical law. 
According to the definition of the jurisconsult Celsus – kept in the first book of the 
Institutions of Ulpianus (jurisconsult and master of the classical juridical 
definition) - „Jus est ars boni et aequi” (Law is the art of good and of equity) 
(Dig.I,1). In this sense, according to the teachings of Justinian, the judge must give 
a verdict „ex bono et aequo”, that is according to the good and equity (Institutions, 
the IV-th book, cap. VI, 20). 
Therefore, the word „ars" (art), which has to be understood in the sense of 
„craft/science", consisted in „distinguishing what is the good and what is the 
equity, ..., as regards the evaluation of the man`s deeds and the regulation of the 
relations between people" (Stan, 1943, p. 92).  
As regards the notion of „aequitas/tis” (equity), we must specify that it is not 
tantamount to equality, given that two human beings are not equal by virtue of 
their physical and mental identity, of their genetic heritage. Actually, the legislator 
or the judge does not distribute the equality, but only the equity, as the Roman 
jurisprudence once stated. 
At the Romans, „the written law” (scriptum ius) was made up of „lex” (law), 
„plebiscita” (plebiscite), „senatusconsulta” (senatus – consulte), „constitutiones” 
(imperial constitutions) and „responsa prudentium” (the sentences of the 
                                                 
1
 Îndreptarea legii, 1652/The amendment of the Law, 1652, 1962.  
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jurisconsults) (Institutiones, liber primus, II. 3), and „the unwritten law” (non 
scriptum ius) consisted „in what the custom has legalized (quod usus 
comprobavit).  
The Institutions of Justinian specified that „the customs” settled since ancient 
times, „approved by the ones who follow them, have the power of a law (legem)” 
(liber primus, II, 9).  
But what is the law (lex)?! How was it defined by the Romans?! According to the 
definition of Trebonian and Theophilus, professors at the School of Law of 
Constantinople and to professor Dorotheu from the famous School of Law of 
Beirut – to whom Emperor Justinian has enthrusted the task of editing the juridical 
handbook entitled „Institutiones” (Institutions) – „lex est quod populus Romanus 
senatorio magistratu interrogante, veluti consule, constituebat” (the law is what the 
Roman people decided at the proposal of a senatorial magistrate, as, for example, a 
consul) (Institutiones, liber primus I, 4).   
But what is "justice" (justitia)?! In what terms was it defined by the Romans?! 
Justice (justitia) was understood by the Romans in the terms of a „constans et 
perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens”1 (a constant and steady will to give 
everybody what they deserve), and „juris prudentia” (jurisprudentia) was 
considered to be „divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti 
scientia” (Bitoleanu, p. 39) (the knowledge of the divine and human things, the 
science of what is just and injust). In this sense, in order to distinguish between 
what is just and what is injust, a moral law, a moral criterion was always 
necessary.   
In the opinion of some historians of Romanian law, „the origin" of the princely 
judgement in the Romanian Principalities „must be looked for in the principle of 
the Roman law, ars aequi et boni, which expresses the bound between the public 
good and equity (impartiality); in other words, the norms of law must be 
interpreted and applied according to the principles of equity. In fact, the persistence 
of the good and old people as a jurisdictional organ – they say – is the proof of the 
recognition of the authority of an institution which perfectly expressed the 
concordance between Law and Justice" (Bitoleanu, p. 39).  
That we do not only refer to „the principles of equity” - in the sense of 
„impartiality” - is confirmed by the very definition of Celsus, based on which we 
                                                 
1
 Institutiones (2002). The Ist book, ch. I, transl. by Vl. Hanga, Bucharest.  
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can notice that „jus" (the law) is also defined in relation to the moral values, the 
first of which is the good. Indeed, for Celsus (the II-nd century A.D.), „jus”, as an 
„ars boni et aequi” (the art of the good and of the equity) is defined by relating it to 
the values with a high ethical (moral) content, given that both the good and the 
equity are entities of Ethics. Anyhow, we should not forget that, in those times (in 
illo tempore), the law had not yet „freed” itself from the tutelage of Ethics „and its 
purpose was the fulfillment of the moral good” (Popa, 1998, p. 93).  
The fact that „law” is „in a last analysis a moral entity, a species of the supreme 
moral value of good" (Stan, 1943, p. 93), is certified by the very notion of „law”. 
In fact, as an adjective, the word “just” is only associated in the case of 
considerations of a moral nature (e.g., a just man, a just action, a just punishment 
etc.), hence the necessity of the moral integrity of the person appointed to 
administer „the justice”.  
Aware of this reality, some practicians of law write that „the training and 
specialization for the position of magistrate, …, must prove the fact that the 
respective person has developed, during the period of evolution and professional 
development, an irreproachable civic and moral conduct” (Susanu, 2004, p. 6). At 
the same time, the judge should be „not only a person with an irreproachable civic 
and moral conduct, with a high professional level and adequate specialization in 
his field, with a confirmed experience. He must be able to reestablish the 
lawfulness in the law case that he is judging” (Susanu, 2004, p. 6). In this sense, 
the re-establishment of the state of lawfulness can only be made by the one who is 
free, including of passions, vices and immoral acts. 
Among the requirements for the judges from „the European Court on Human 
Rights”, the Convention for the defense of human Rights and of the fundamental 
Liberties – that was adopted in Rome on November the 4-th, 1950 and entered into 
force between September 1-st and 3-rd, 1953 – also provided the obligation that 
these judges „shall be of high moral character…” (art. 21 al.1) (Susanu, 2004, p. 
6). 
Of course, the same requirement has to be valid for the national judge, who has to 
be „… a vital element as the juridical protection of human rights is concerned”, 
with a high professional level and a high moral conscience of his responsibility „… 
as regards the uniform us enforcement of the Convention in the internal judiciary 
system, accomplishing, in an efficient and constitutionalist manner – professor 
Marin Voicu, former judge at the European Court of Human Rights wrote, – a 
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synthesis between the exigencies of the Convention and the constraints, inhibitory 
to certain extents and in certain periods, related to the quality of the law, to the 
national procedural rules and even to the dominant jurisprudence” (Voicu, 2001, p. 
23).  
Finally, this condition, according to which the national judge also has to be „of 
high moral character”, is also imposed by the fact that „the direct enforcement of 
the Convention and its priority within the national internal law is a central element 
of the protection of human rights, …” (Voicu, 2001, p. 28).  
As it is well-known, in the period from 1948 to 1989, as the Courses of the Faculty 
of Law are concerned, they laid the stress „… on the materialist-dialectic and 
Marxist explanation of the political and juridical phenomena”, and they 
„emphasized the role of the material factors in the determination, in the last resort, 
of the institutions of law and of the state institutions, …” (Popa, 1998, p. 20). As 
an immediate consequence, the spiritual and moral-religious values – including the 
academic subjects carrier of these values – have not only been ignored and left 
aside, but eliminated from the Halls and the Lecture Rooms of Universities, so that 
even daring to talk about these things was considered an infringement of law and 
reprimanded accordingly.  
Actually, for the „new man” – who was created commensurate with the apostles of 
the atheist and communist ideology (Marx, Engels and Lenin) – there should only 
be a single „law” to defend the so-called „conquests of the proletariate” and to 
punish in an exemplary manner the ones who merely had the intention to talk about 
these values, actually typical of the Romanian people since its genesis, hence the 
criminal actions committed by the ones who have even demolished some churches 
that were historical monuments, founded by the ones who have enacted the „law”, 
the customs and the country.  
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